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Basic Arguments and Prescriptions
Accelerated Development in sub-Saharan Africa: an
Agenda for Action [World Bank 1981] is too important
a document to be reviewed or analysed simply in terms
of its internal weaknesses and contradictions -
though there are a substantial number. To appreciate
the full implications of the document, it is essential to
consider its general arguments in the context of the
current international economic situation. Agreement
or disagreement with the Report's general arguments
and prescriptions under current circumstances,
constitutes the essential backdrop for any sensible
discussion of the specifics of the Report. For this
reason one may agree with many of the Report's
detailed and specific propositions, while nevertheless
regarding the document as a whole as fundamentally
wrong in its analysis; self-serving in its implicit
allocation of responsibility for current problems;
misleading in its broad policy prescriptions; and
totally unrealistic both with respect to the social and
political implications of its 'solutions' and with respect
to its assumptions about real aid flws, price and
market prospects for African exports and the
robustness of Africa's struggling institutional
structures.
One central theme of the Report is the now very
familiar call for governments to reduce the level of
their economic involvement, and to make that which
remains more 'technically competent'. This pro-
position is so central to the Report that in the
Executive Summary it is argued:
to achieve their growth and equity objective,
governments need to select a limited number of
activities in which public sector involvement is
essential and then undertake them efficiently.
Other activities can be managed by apropriate
market signals.. . This basic approach to domestic
policy is the unifying theme of the study.
[World Bank 1981:4]
We shall examine ttiis further below, after a brief
discussion of the reasons why it is possible to arrive at
such a broadly negative view of this particular Report
about Africa at this particular time.
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The Report's argument runs broadly as follows:
Africa's economic performance over the past two
decades has been extremely disappointing, and
prospects for the next decade are even more gloomy.
International economic difficulties bear a share of
responsibility for the worsening situation, but the
relatively poor record of this region, when compared
to other areas of the developing world, suggests that
Africa has special problems particular to itself. These
are attributed largely to African government policies,
although, by the same token, the fact that virtually the
whole of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has fared
relatively badly over the past decade, suggests that
whatever it is that is particular to the region is also
relatively common within it.
Finally the Report argues that, in any event, whatever
may be the degree of blame to be attached to the
international economy, the African economies must
broadly accept the external environment as given and
do the best they can under adverse circumstances. This
places the greatest premium on improving the
efficiency with which resources are used within the
African economies themselves. Africans simply must
help themselves, and to this end they must cut out the
myriad examples of wasteful and inappropriate
resource allocation cited in the Report.
This much of the argument is well documented and
convincingly argued. Indeed the Report's ultimate
value may lie primarily in its having presented this
widely accepted picture in a systematic and careful
manner, and in having comprehensively marshalled
the available evidence to support it. Certainly the
argument thus far should be considered common
ground. Unfortunately such 'common ground' does
not take one anywhere near to agreement about just
what problems are particular to SSA, or what might
constitute effective policies to increase the efficiency of
resource use.
Distortions, Exports, Competition and
Efficiency
In addressing these issues the Report relies less on the
African evidence it has marshalled, and more on the
world view now so militantly expounded by the post
McNamara World Bank. In its bare essentials this
exhorts the developing countries to avoid 'market
distortions' at all costs. Most particularly, they must
avoid discrimination as between goods for export and
those for domestic consumption. In general they
should expose themselves to competition in order to
attain the efficiency increases which such exposure will
bring, and also in order to develop economic
structures appropriate to the country's comparative
advantage. Both generally, and in this Report, this old
argument is asserted with renewed vigour on the basis
of a campaign whose strident tone is ironically
reminiscent of earlier Maoist campaigns. It might be
called the 'learn from the four little tigers' campaign.'
Its message is clear: let the market work and even
under the difficult conditions of the 1980s you can
grow rapidly and diffuse material benefits throughout
the population.
Thus when the Report asserts that the specificity of
SSA lies centrally in its excessive and technically
incompetent government involvement in economic
affairs, it makes little use of, or even disregards, the
evidence it has itself accumulated. The critical
argument on exports and efficiency is ultimately
asserted as derived from the 'NIC debate' (newly
industrialising country debate). It is argued even
though the Report's own evidence provides no
support at all for the idea that in Africa those
governments with less state intervention (however
defined) have been more successful economically,
socially or politically. Indeed the evidence prescribed
in the Statistical Appendix and the text tables on
government spending is not easily reconcilable with
any general proposition relating proportion or growth
of public expenditure with growth of GDP.2
The Report does, very briefly, confront the awkward
'fact' that in Africa state revenue generated by
taxation is not generally high by developing country
standards, but sustains its basic assertion simply by
pointing out that in some cases the state collects
substantial additional revenues from various market-
ing boards. This cavalier and superficial treatment of
the only African empirical evidence presented for this
central assertion does nothing to allay one's
scepticism.3
The 'four little tigers' being Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and
South Korea. The 'campaign' is strangely reminiscent of the old
maoist campaigns - viz 'learn from Ta Chai'.
2 Table 4.2, p41 shows aveak positive correlation between rate of
growth of public administration and defence spending and growth
of GDP over 1970-79. However, the most likely causal linkage is
high GDP growth to high revenue growth to high administrative!
military expenditure growth, not the reverse.
All the more so since elsewhere in the Report marketing board losses
are - accurately for at least some countries - presented as a major
fiscal drain!
When it comes to the nature, rather than the extent, of
government intervention, the Report simply avoids
any discussion of African empirical evidence, apart
from citing a number of examples of 'bad' economic
policies pursued by certain governments. No classifi-
cation by degree of market orientation is attempted. It
is therefore impossible to tell how the authors of the
Report would classify a country like Zaire; how they
would regard the francophone countries with their
CFA francs tied to the French franc; or whether they
would see the Liberia of the 1970s as having been
relatively market-oriented. Unfortunately, however,
in the absence of any attempt by the Report to classify
government intervention in any systematic way, the
argument remains a simple assertion derived from
'other circumstances', namely those of the NICs in the
late 1960s and the 1970s.
NICs and sub-Saharan Africa
There are two problems with this procedure. The first
concerns the nature of the conclusions legitimately to
be drawn from the NICs; the second concerns the
applicability of such conclusions to SSA in the 1980s.
First of all, the 'lessons of the NICs' are in fact by no
means as clear-cut as the Report implies. Indeed the
burgeoning analytical literature on the economies of
South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore (though not that
on Hong Kong) is remarkably unanimous in
contradicting many of the characteristics of the NICs
most widely asserted by those who wish to present the
latter as the 'embodiment of the neo-classical parable'.
State intervention in these economies is generally
found to be very extensive as well as highly direct and
centralised. It includes (as also in Japan, the original
NIC) extensive state control over financial institutions;
specific controls on capital flows and on direct
investment; the widespread use of quotas and other
forms of trade management; and the frequent pursuit
of dynamic objectives requiring investment decisions
in research or production which run counter to the
implications of prevailing market price signals.
What emerges therefore, is a picture of the NICs (apart
from Hong Kong) as societies with a very high level of
state involvement in both social and economic affairs,
who are able to use the control thus established to
respond relatively rapidly and effectively to changing
conditions in the international economy. Furthermore
their ability to do this successfully appears to be
closely linked to a number of important conditioning
factors in addition to the standard low wage/output
ratio, namely: access to virtually unlimited (and for
most of the l970s very cheap) credit; relatively little
access to developed country markets for industrial
goods; ability to maintain domestic political stability;
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and possession of a substantial domestic technological
base. The latter was invariably established in the
course of a more or less lengthy phase of
discriminatory' import substitution.
This alternative view of the NICs naturally implies
rather different conclusions in so far as their
experience can be used to derive lessons for African
countries. First, national economic efficiency appears
to benefit from extensive state intervention on some
corporatist state model; ie, market management is a
condition for, not an obstacle to, taking advantage of
market forces. Furthermore both the actual experience
of the NICs, and the very different circumstances of
the African countries in the 1980s, require a sharp
qualification of claims for the virtue of 'neutrality'
between production for export and production for
domestic consumption. The real lesson of the NICs in
this respect is that neutrality in this sense can be more
effectively established in economies which are
relatively strong both technically and institutionally.
Even then it exists alongside a wide range of specific
quantitative restrictions on imports and of a panoply
of 'non-tariff barriers', as well as of different specific
export incentives, all of which are particularly easily
used in the corporate state models in question.
Finally, even most of the strong neo-classical
exponents of the NIC experience do acknowledge that
the competitive strength which enabled the NICs to
seize the opportunities of the 1970s, required as a
necessary (though not a sufficient) condition, the prior
build-up of a significant manufacturing capacity
through a (discriminatory) import substitution policy.
Because the African economies have by and large not
yet acquired such manufacturing capabilities, not even
a straight neo-classical interpretation of the NICs can
logically be used to imply a strong case for 'neutrality'
as between exports and domestically consumed goods
at the present time, nor indeed until manufacturing
capacities have been further developed through
judicious import substitution.
In short the Report's heavy reliance on, and frequent
reference to, the NIC experience to back up the central
assertion that African governments should reduce the
extent and change (in a specific manner) the nature of
their economic involvement is neither logically nor
historically convincing. Indeed, in so far as such an
analogy is at all legitimate, its implications are totally
different from and, indeed, almost the exact reverse of
those suggested.
Government Weaknesses: What Is To Be
Done?
While the NIC analogy is central to the Report's 'case'
against government economic involvement in Africa,
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there are many other arguments to this effect occuring
eclectically throughout this Report. These appeal to
the now very general disillusionment with govern-
ments, shared more and more across ideological
divides. Who would deny that: there is corruption in
government circles; many government policies have
paid insufficient attention to market signals; more
technical expertise would be desirable; black markets
are manifestations of underlying tensions and
disequilibria; or that all of these factors together
contribute to a wasteful use of resources? If all this is
true - as it is - what conclusions follow? The Report
repeatedly suggests and implies that surely its views on
government involvement are amply confirmed. But
this is simply not the case. While the problems listed
are real enough, they do not logically imply or even
necessarily support, the 'solutions' proposed. Further-
more the so-called solutions frequently have little
substantive content in the form in which they are
proposed. What does it mean, after all, to assert the
need for greater economic expertise at a time when the
very foundations of 'orthodox economic analysis'
have been widely discredited in business and
government circles in the industrial countries? Or to
advocate more and more uncritical African acceptance
of external technical advice when a number of SSAs'
most palpable economic disaster stories have been
firmly grounded upon it?
Before proceeding to discuss the main deficiencies of
the argument it is necessary to stress that disagreement
with the Report's handling of the issue of the state,
does not imply acceptance or support of the general
way in which existing African states have intervened in
social and economic affairs. What is being argued here
is that the Report is both unconvincing and wrong in
arguing that a reduction in state involvement and a
shift towards more narrowly technocratic state
intervention are centrally important and (together
with increased aid) adequate means of effecting a
major improvement in Africa's economic per-
formance. Neither the vaguely argued NIC analogy,
nor the loosely applied African evidence supports this
claim. The repeated recounting of alleged 'bad'
government interventions, simply does not constitute
an argument, especially when certain critical issues are
wholly excluded from consideration.4
This paper will conclude by considering four such
issues which, quite apart from the problems previously
discussed, would require systematic consideration if
this Report were to make any significant and
This contention is not inherently ideological in the capitalist/
socialist sense. The success - in their governing class coalitions'
own terms - of Brazil, Taiwan, South Korea and Singapore rests
on extensive and detailed state social and economic intervention,
even though all are clearly capitalist, indeed conservative capitalist,
states.
constructive contribution to the analysis of problems
of state intervention in African economies.
Political Forces and Institutional Structures
The first issue concerns the nature of the political
forces in control of the states in question. The Report's
failure to grapple with that issue, understandable as
that might be from a political point of view (ie the
politics of international agency report writing),
unfortunately means that its pronouncements on this
question can scarcely be taken seriously.
The most desirable level and form of government
involvement in economic affairs simply cannot be
specified without reference to the objectives being
pursued by particular governments. These objectives
and the political forces which they reflect will play a
decisive role in determining whether certain kinds of
advice are likely to prove acceptable in practice, and, if
accepted, how they would affect social and economic
performance as well as political stability.
The Report ignores this question, apart from one
passage in which it seeks to suggest that the changes in
government involvement are in effect so minor that
they do not call into question the political orientation
of any particular government. Unfortunately, given
the central place accorded to this issue in the
argument, this disclaimer appears more than a little
disingenuous.
The second issue to be raised concerns the nature of
the 'non-state' institutional structures, within which
market is supposed to be given much greater scope.
This issue is implicitly raised by the Report's rather
awkward attempts to deny the logic, or existence, of its
own politics. Its hesitation in pushing its 'night-
watchman state' arguments to their logical con-
clusions, is presumably partially derived from a
recognition that alternatives to state services and
enterprises are structures which are extremely weak
and potentially manipulable and rather different from
those posited in a competitive, free market model.
This certainly would be one way to reconcile the
Report's central theme on the excesses and failures of
government intervention, with rather extraordinary
statements such as:
the vocation of planning ministries, is to become
true priority setting agencies for development
expenditures, respected contributors to policy
discussions, and the training ministry for govern-
ment economists.
It should be underscored that the question is not
one of radical shifts in the social division of labour,
but rather of marginal changes. By shifting some
activities to private hands, significant gains in
output may be possible with relatively little
sacrifice of sociopolitical objectives.
[World Bank 198 1:33,37]
These statements might be combined with the
previously suggested 'interpretations' of the NICs to
recast the Report's arguments in a manner which
would be more internally consistent and potentially
plausible. This would argue for very extensive state
involvement in the economy, but a state involvement
characterised by high levels of technical expertise,
employed to speed up and facilitate the particular
economy's integration into the international market.
Unfortunately the Report does not make that
argument in any coherent manner.5 Furthermore, it
does not deal explicitly with the weakness of current
non-state institutional structures, nor with the
devastating effect which the current crisis has on them.
It is a sobering thought that even with a strong
institutional base markets are known to function very
badly under extreme disequilibrium conditions.
If the Report were to develop and reconcile its
arguments in some such way it would, however, have
to confront the third and fourth issue to be considered,
namely the nature of the 'technical expertise' required
and the appropriate definition of 'efficiency'. These
are not the self-evident and universally applicable
concepts which the Report seems to imply.
What 'Technical Expertise'? 'Efficiency' for
What?
It is ironic that just when the 'orthodoxies' of technical
economic expertise are more and more discredited in
the industrial countries, they should be increasingly
fervently preached to developing countries on the
basis of a highly questionable interpretation of the
NIC experience.
It is, furthermore, rather galling to see the World
Bank's 'experts' point the finger at the inadequate
technical expertise of African governments when in
fact these same governments have relied so heavily on
the 'expertise' of the Bank, and other external
consultants. This is not to argue the ex ante plausibility
of much of that advice. Given existing knowledge
Some fragments may exist but not necessarily very efficient ones.
Increases in relative prices and real purchasing power of export
crops are advocated as generally desirable. Since the global price
changes for these commodities have been in precisely the opposite
direction, at least since 1977 (and, on current Bank projections
issued just afterAgenda, will remain so in the 1980s), this is hardly a
simple appeal to unimpeded comparative advantage and free play of
market forces. Whether it is a desirable form of managed market
specialisation is a rather differenz question.
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some was good, some questionable and some pretty
clearly wrong. In retrospect most now looks much
worse. The simple fact is that in the l970s the world's
economy changed to such an extent that a vast range
of investment decisions made by 'accredited, experts'
have simply turned out to be unviable. Major
corporations are spending much of their time and
effort closing down, scrapping and rationalising
facilities built quite recently. Some at least (eg Shell,
Imperial Chemical Industries) have had the sense to
call into question the nature of the models (the
'expertise' !), on the basis of which they made those
decisions. It is about time the World Bank also
reflected on the possibility that their 'expertise' has
limits, which become more severe as the global
economy suffers from greater and greater instability
and uncertainty.
The Report's treatment of 'expertise' and of
'efficiency' is deeply problematic. It is ultimately and
fundamentally derived from an equilibrium model of
economics which implicitly assumes an essentially
non-conflictive (Say's Law) world in which the market
diffuses benefits even to the weakest link in the chain.
In fact the Report is really nothing more than a
relatively crude assertion of that view put forward as a
remedy for Africa's present situation. While the
Report does little to document or to articulate the
claims of that perspective in respect to specific SSA
contexts and countries, it will appear convincing to
those who already have an over-riding faith in the
market and/or in the incompetence of African states.
For others it will appear as an eclectic and ideological
argument full of internal contradictions and failing to
face its own political implications in any coherent way.
Faulty Solutions and Real Alternatives
The sad fact is that the 'solutions' to Africa's problems
proposed by the Report are not essentially different
from the advice the Bank has been imposing on Africa
all through the period during which the current crisis
took shape.6 Their past impact on Africa has been
more than a little ambiguous. Its future impact could
well be nothing short of disastrous.
The inescapable fact is that the African economies
enter the 1980s with structures which are simply not
viable in the existing international context. This means
that in order to function with any degree of
The two clearest shifts are reduced emphasis on human investment
and social service development and the almost total disappearance
of absolute poverty elimination and distribution issues from the
Agenda. However, the latter arguably never was embodied to a
significant extent in actual Bank projects, while the former was
either justified in somewhat forced external contribution to growth
terms or treated as outside central production oriented economic
policy frames.
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effectiveness, they require a level of imports which
simply cannot be paid for. Borrowing to fill the gap
represents a 'solution' so long as export markets, net
foreign exchange earnings, productivity levels, growth
rates, credit availability and real interest rates stand in
a certain relationship to each other. Presently these
relationships are hopelessly out of line and the result
has been to increase dramatically absolute shortages,
black markets, corruption, and breakdowns in
utilities, transport and other services. It is both
arrogant and meaningless for the Bank to assert in that
context that, given the other parameters and
irrespective of political considerations and problems,
the way forward lies through a greater concern with
technical expertise and a greater reliance on the
market.
Such advice cannot be followed for any length of time
under current circumstances because the social and
political consequences of following it would be so
dramatic that the policies would be devastated by the
political whirlwinds which would be unleashed. As in
the past these domestic political responses could then
be blamed for the disasters which follow, rather than
being seen as more or less direct consequences of the
acceptance of the externally designed policy pre-
scriptions.
Today the international market is in such disequili-
brium that to work with equilibrium models is simply
absurd. There is not full employment, and without full
employment 'international trade' determines not only
the pattern of specialisation, but also the relative
distribution of unemployment, economic redundancy
and starvation. Africa, with its heavy reliance on a
limited range of primary exports and its rudimentary
manufacturing capabilities, is a prime candidate for
more than its share of the latter.
African economies can respond to the current
impasse, by securing for a smaller proportion of their
populations their now 'traditional' international life
styles, at the cost of ever greater social and political
polarisation and repression (eg Kenya in 1982);
increasing tendencies to general economic disinte-
.gration (eg Zaire since 1975); and more violently anti-
status quo coups (eg Liberia in 1980, Ghana in 1981).
Alternatively some states - under present or new
management - may abandon the hopelessly
optimistic assumptions of the past, cut back on and
change consumption patterns for elites drastically,
and place primary emphasis on securing the
population's basic necessities on the basis of a less
volatile and more controllable domestic productive
structure which operates with a lower import to
output ratio. That would certainly require extensive
state intervention, but different types of intervention,
usually by governments which are differently
constituted politically than those presently in power.
These are not clearly defined, mutually exclusive
options, but they involve significantly different
emphases and their relative merits vary for different
times and places. Technically one could distinguish
them by the different ways in which each deals with the
potential risks involved in a greater and greater
reliance on international trade. In practice the second,
more cautious option involves short-term sacrifices in
periods of boom and expansion which make it very
difficult to sustain at such times. If the international
situation then deteriorates, the strengths of the more
cautious approach may become apparent, but by then
that option will usually have been pre-empted by the
political consequences of earlier decisions.
For a very few it may be possible to borrow and export
their way out of the current situation, but even that
must be doubted. For the vast majority there is no
such possibility. Meanwhile financial institutions are
scouring the world to find borrowers to whom they
can lend their plentiful funds with some hope of being
repaid. Even Africa would be considered for this role,
if those repayments could be exacted irrespective of
the social and political consequences. From their
perspective this Bank Report theoretically makes very
good sense, though the majority of bankers seem to
understand that the possibility of such an option being
sustained politically for any extended period of time is
remote.
It is to be hoped that some international donors can be
found to help some African states to pursue a less
foolhardy, more sustainable and more equitable
strategy for the l980s, presumably on the basis of a
radically different agenda. However, in the absence of
appropriate political forces within recipient African
countries such efforts too will fail.
Unfortunately this Report not only draws uncon-
vincing conclusions, but fails to identify the real
choices confronting Africa. In so doing, it has done the
search for ameliorative action a substantial disservice.
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